Annie Kuo: Welcome back to Discovery, a Ƶ podcast where we interview the law school’s distinguished guests, faculty and experts from around the world. I'm your host Annie Kuo. Today we're speaking with Guha Krishnamurthi, a prominent voice in constitutional law and criminal procedure. The Dean of the University of Maryland Carey law school in Baltimore says, Guha’s innovative voice on affirmative action both meets and anticipates this moment in American justice. We’re speaking about his paper today, “The Goose and the Gander, How Conservative Precedents Will Save Campus Affirmative Action,” which he co-wrote with Peter Salib of the University of Houston. Professor Krishnamurthi is an associate professor at the University of Maryland in Baltimore as of August 2023. He previously taught at the University of Oklahoma College of Law, South Texas College of Law and was a Climenko Fellow at Harvard Law School. He has a number of credentials. In addition to his JD from the University of Texas, he has MS in math from Michigan, a master of arts and philosophy from UT and have I forgotten anything?
Guha Krishnamurthi: No, that's it.
AK: That's it. But that's a lot. Welcome Guha to the podcast.
GK: Thank you so much. It's so great to be here.
AK: Can you define SFFA for our listeners who may not yet be aware of the companion cases?
GK: Yeah, so SFFA was an organization that was really constructed to challenge affirmative action programs across the country. So, they brought claims against both Harvard, a private institution, and the University of North Carolina, a public school, claiming that they're operating of an affirmative action program, which both schools agree that they do and their websites, you know, showcase their firm, you know, the fact that they are committed to operating affirmative action programs. So, SFFA, challenged both of them. They challenged the UNC program under the Equal Protection Clause of the US Constitution. And they challenged Harvard's program — because it's a private institution, it's not under the Constitution, it's rather under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits, among other things, educational institutions from discriminating in the offering of admission and other programs.
AK: So, what will SFFA change? And I will preface this with, I noticed in your paper, and even as I was reading through both definitive and predictive qualities of your analysis, that it's not really going to change very much. So, maybe a twofold question, what will it change? What will it not change?
GK: Yeah, absolutely. So, Peter and I argue that SFFA will not have the drastic impact on affirmative action programs that lots of commentators, both left and right, both liberal and conservative, sort of present. In particular, what most people think is SFFA would just prohibit universities from operating affirmative action programs. But the SFFA opinion sort of explicitly says that they aren't prohibiting the use of essays, college essays. And the opinion also says it's not prohibiting people from talking about their personal experiences of discrimination. And it doesn't prohibit colleges from taking that into account in determining whether someone can be admitted to their college.
So, based on that, right, it looks like what really has to change is universities have to scrub their websites of claims that they are, you know, operating an affirmative action program that explicitly takes into account race and other factors of diversity. They can't explicitly say that, but what they can do is operate their affirmative action program in the shadows, right, they can, you know, have essays and students can talk about their own diversity in those essays. And admissions programs can take those into account and build their class just as they have.
Well, you might think, right, well, how is that going to work? Isn't it the case that SFFA is going to look at the demographics of the incoming classes at UNC and Harvard and say, hey, it looks like you guys are doing exactly the same thing as you were doing before, and that's illegal. Well, this is the sort of critical observation that Peter and I make, which is that because of a number of conservative decisions from the Supreme Court, principally Washington v. Davis, and other cases McCleskey v. Kemp, the court said that in order to bring an Equal Protection Clause claim, you can't just rely on statistical evidence, you've got to have a smoking gun evidence, you've got to have evidence that somebody was intentionally discriminating. And just to give you a sense of what this did, this foreclosed a lot of claims by people, principally disadvantaged, historically disadvantaged minorities, that were claiming that they were being discriminated against. Washington v. Davis, itself was about black police officers claiming that the admissions program for the police department, which involved a vocabulary test was discriminating against black people, in particular. And they use statistical evidence to show that, and the court said, that wasn't good enough. So, our claim here is that organizations like SFFA, are going to rely on statistical evidence to show that affirmative action program is going on and the court for decades now has said that's not good enough. And so, as a result, it's going to be very difficult for SFFA and other types of organizations to bring claims against affirmative action.
AK: I want to drill down quickly into the University of Michigan, what the undergraduate admissions were doing versus what the law school at Michigan was doing. Could you articulate about those particular practices and the differences?
Ұ: Yes, absolutely. And so, it's super interesting, because those cases are Grutter and Gratz. And that's what gave rise to our current sort of admissions programs. The undergraduate admissions use checkboxes where people indicated what their race was, as part of a point program. And you would get certain kinds of point valuations for being a legacy admission, being a particular disadvantaged racial minority, being an athlete, etc. And together, if you got something like 100 points out of, you know, 150 points, then you had a really good chance of admission. But if you didn't get that, then you would have a worse chance of admission. And essentially, the Supreme Court said, the use of points in that way, and especially rather large number of points, it was like something like 20 points for being of a disadvantaged minority status was unconstitutional, it was too much. And that race was often a determinative factor in admissions in this way.
Contrast that with what the law school did, which had a much smaller number of applicants. They would consider each application holistically, not assigning weights based on racial status, or economic status or, or any of these things, but rather, they had a kind of admissions committee that would look at applications holistically, whatever that meant. And they would admit each person individually, that's what they said. And the court said that kind of program was constitutional, because it took into account everybody individually, it was holistic, race wasn't determinative, it wasn't a huge assignment of weight for racial status. And basically, after that, most programs hewed to the template of the law school, and what that meant was even Michigan's undergraduate program went that way. What did they have to do? They had to hire more people to read through the huge number of applications that you would get at the undergraduate school as opposed to a professional school. But schools just basically did this. That's what UNC did. That's what Harvard did. So, it was just, you know, schools, hiring more people, especially during admission season, to read through these applications and give them you know, sort of an assessment, but again, a holistic assessment and not a points-based assessment. Looking at each person individually. And what Peter and I say is that this is really just obfuscating what was going on. The real problem with the undergraduate program was it was just too explicit, whereas the law school was doing something that was murkier.
AK: So, in the Washington v. Davis and McCluskey v. Kemp cases, direct proof is required. So, the scrubbing of the website is kind of like a marketing exercise, obscure what they're actually doing, which is maintaining the status quo. How does that continue to provide cover for these affirmative action practices?
GK: Yeah, it's a really good question. I mean, the idea basically, is, since Bakke, a Supreme Court case that said explicit set asides, or quotas, are unconstitutional in affirmative action. Since that case, colleges have been operating affirmative action programs that are holistic in nature. And so, it's not very clear what colleges are doing. And two other cases Grutter and Gratz, that came up at University of Michigan, and what I have been referring to before, really affirmed the ability for colleges to operate this kind of holistic program that isn't, you know, it doesn't make race a determinative factor. It's just one of many factors. The Supreme Court gave that the okay. And since then, what's basically been going on is affirmative action programs have been holistic, and therefore murky in nature. Peter and I call it deliberate obfuscation. You know, it's just, you know, those schools are trying to say, we're not going to be explicit about why we admit any particular person.
So, at the same time, schools are telling everyone, hey, we do operate an affirmative action program. Now, suppose they stop saying that — they clear their websites of that — they do what they have been doing all along, which is very murky. Nobody knows why any particular person has ever been admitted to the school. Then it will be very, very difficult to determine why anybody is admitted to the school going into the future. And based on that, you know, you really won't be able to know what's the basis for their admission, and whether they're operating an affirmative action program at all. All you will know at best is you might have some rough idea of what the demographic statistics are for a particular incoming class. And the Supreme Court has already told us, that's not good enough.
Now, the sort of next question is, well, and what if the Supreme Court just changes its mind on that? What happens then? Suppose they say, well, we see this is problematic. You can now bring statistical evidence to show discrimination claims. Peter and I point out that this is a double-edged sword. This might actually be a boon to progressive and liberal causes because for decades now they have been trying to bring claims of discrimination based on statistical evidence, and they've been shut out of the court. And if the Supreme Court says we're going to reverse course, statistical evidence is enough, then what you'll see is actually progressives winning on other kinds of discrimination claims. And it gets slightly better to. We saw recently progressive groups challenging legacy admissions based on the statistically discriminatory impact against minority candidates and its benefit to majority candidates. And so, if the Supreme Court says statistical evidence is good enough, that would really open the door for other challenges of college admissions that have had a traditionally discriminatory impact against minorities. So, interestingly, you know, if the Supreme Court wants to change its course and allow in statistical evidence, we really don't know what the net impact is going to be. And I think that there's a lot of room for optimism for progressives and liberals to bring the kinds of cases that they've been trying to bring all along.
AK: Won't statistics hold institutions accountable for the individual admissions decisions on the basis of race? Well, I’m trying to follow now is if there was a challenge based on statistical or at least empirical evidence, it would then open the floodgates to challenge other kinds of admissions decisions like that of the legacies. Help me complete that. What does that then mean? It just means that, like, how are you making your decisions at all? Is everything under a microscope?
GK: I think so, right, I think if we are in the situation where everybody gets to challenge admissions programs, what we might find is everything is under a microscope. And that might just really hinder universities from being able to operate admissions programs at all. And that usually will end up in something like a revisit by the courts about what kind of doctrine we have going on here. But one interesting point for university officials is that you might think SFFA would give them cause for pause in operating their admissions programs with an affirmative action criterion, because they might be litigation averse. They might think, oh, we should stop because the Supreme Court has already said that this is unconstitutional. And even if there are sort of technical ways to get around this as Krishnamurthi and Salib have indicated, there's some risk here. There's legal risk here. Let's table our affirmative action programs.
One thing our observation shows is, there is really no way to avoid litigation risk here. If it's the case that statistical claims can be brought, they will be brought from all sides. And so, there's no way to avoid litigation risk. If you say, ok, we're going to remove our, quote unquote, affirmative action criteria, but we're going to still operate as we had before with legacies, then people are going to challenge that, and they're going to challenge it as racially discriminatory. And there's going to be litigation risks there. So, I think, you know, there's this sort of two points, one that you were alluding to, how is this going to work in the future? I don't know. And that's why I think the Supreme Court is not going to get rid of this bar on bringing statistical claims. But if they were to, it's sort of a message to university officials that maybe you should continue to operate just as you were, because there's no way to legitimately avoid litigation risk.
AK: Are the checkboxes going to continue where you self-identify, and then how is that policed?
GK: Yeah, it's a really, it's a very good question. So, one thing that we you know, anybody who's applied to any kind of program knows is there are often checkboxes that ask for racial demographic information, sex, and gender and other kinds of important information. And one might think, ok, well, even if the court has allowed essays, checkboxes are going to be really problematic here because checkboxes how are they being used? That seems explicitly racially discriminatory. Peter and I think that checkboxes still have a legitimate function, even in a post-SFFA-like world. And that is universities may use checkboxes, the data that they gather from checkboxes, as a good check on themselves to determine what their admissions program is actually doing.
So, suppose one of these universities has checkboxes, they operate their admissions program without considering the checkboxes. But periodically, let's say once 50% of their class has been admitted, once 75% of their class has been admitted, and once 90% of their class has been admitted, they look at the racial demographics. And they ask themselves, hey, is our program sort of discriminating despite our best efforts? And if so, maybe we need to change aspects of our programs, not so much that they have to change who they admit because SFFA does seem to indicate that might be unconstitutional. And if somebody explicitly says, oh, hey, we've admitted too many people of this racial background, we need to readjust, that would be you know, if they wrote that an email, that would be the kind of direct evidence that would garner, you know, help support a claim. But instead, they could say, well, look, we've been operating this program in this way. And maybe this has elements of implicit bias or subconscious discrimination. We need to investigate and audit or a program, that is still a useful function. And we think that that is still legal.
AK: I was going to ask you about something that came up during the faculty colloquium. Someone raised this issue of civil disobedience. Are the higher ed institutions continuing as per usual, even with these Supreme Court rulings, actually practicing civil disobedience? Can you address that question?
GK: Yeah. So, you know, one question that we've been posed when suggesting this kind of rebellious position is, well, wouldn't it be sort of wrongful for university administrators even If the SFFA opinion is inarticulate, wouldn't it be wrongful to continue as they have been when they know that the Supreme Court is telling them they shouldn't? We have a couple of responses to this. One is if universities are genuinely committed to affirmative action and diversifying their campus, they may think of their continued adherence to such a program as a sort of aspect of civil disobedience. Yes, the government is telling us in the form of the Supreme Court, telling us not to do this. But we think that this is actually a part of justice, and we need to continue with it. So, that's one rationale.
Another rationale is that SFFA and in fact, the Court's jurisprudence on affirmative action since Bakke — Bakke, Grutter, Gratz, Fisher and SFFA — is altogether incoherent. And so, as a result of its incoherence, university officials may think we're just going to proceed as we best know how, and that is kind of doing what we were doing before. Yes, we will scrub websites, but we will do what we've always been trying to do, which is create a just, diverse campus.
One of the interesting examples for this is the SFFA opinion suggests that it would be okay for someone to talk about their personal experiences of discrimination, and that universities could take into account their personal experience of discrimination, but they shouldn't take into account the race of the person. Well, that itself may sound sort of confusing to anybody who listens to that. How do I take into account one's experience of personal discrimination that was based on race without also taking into account that person's race? So how do you do that? It's unclear. And I think university officials reading that opinion, trying their best efforts to make sense of it may think that's incoherent. That really doesn't make sense. And we have a commitment to justice and to diversity on campus. So, we're going to continue doing what we thought we could do before. We will follow the sort of formal strictures of the SFFA opinion. But other than that, we're going to stick to it.
AK: In closing, is there anything from you and Peter's paper that hasn't been posited here? A point you wanted to make about the future of race-based admissions?
GK: Yes, so one really interesting thing about SFFA is how far this is going to go. I am deeply skeptical that the holding and the direction of the Supreme Court, foreshadowed in SFFA, is going to be limited to university admissions. It may move to other aspects of life, including whether scholarships can be targeted at particular racial groups, it could move to whether funding of startups and businesses can be targeted at particular racial or ethnic groups, or even groups based on sex and gender. So, the reach of SFFA may be much broader. And so, the implications that are going on here extend beyond the campus. And I think that's something for us to keep a very close eye on.
AK: An innovative voice on affirmative action, Guha Krishnamurthi is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Maryland Carey School of Law in Baltimore. Thanks for joining us today, Guha.
GK: Awesome. Thank you so much. This is great.